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Abstract
The present study gives data to the history of lay 
jurisdiction in Europe focusing the attention to the 
criticism of the Hungarian jury system between 1867 
and 1914 via the presentation of the legal status of juries 
and the summary of a famous criminal case happened 
in Hungary concerning to jury behaviour. One can 
read details about the professional opponent of and the 
experiences of trials by jury written by outstanding 
Hungarian jurist at the beginning of the 20th century.
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INTRODUCTION
In the last third of the 19th century, the jury was an 
essential element of the ideal of rule of law in all 
the developed European countries. In the absence of 
constitutional jurisdiction, many celebrated it as the 
instrument to lessen and to provide relative control for the 
inflexibility of rules of law, and at the same time it was 
regarded as the means of curbing the judicial power based 
on statutory positivism as a continent-wide distrust arose 
towards professional, trained judges remunerated by the 
state. Due to the intermediary effect of the Napoleonic 
codification in France (1808), the jury was respected as 
one of the utmost democratic, liberal legal institutions, 
which held the most prestigious place among the values of 
procedural law of the European states for half a century. 
This also proves that the ideal of “Europeanism” resting 
upon common traditions – as the need for a substantial 
ideal uniting the nations – already existed at that time. 
However, the First World War overthrew the conception of 
the liberal state and pushed judgment by the jury into the 
background, too, although such signs could be observed 
from the turn of the century.
1.  INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
In the last third of the 19th century, the jury was an 
essential element of the ideal of rule of law in all 
the developed European countries. In the absence of 
constitutional jurisdiction, many celebrated it as the 
instrument to lessen and to provide relative control for the 
inflexibility of rules of law, and at the same time it was 
regarded as the means of curbing the judicial power based 
on statutory positivism as a continent- wide distrust arose 
towards professional, trained judges remunerated by the 
state. Due to the intermediary effect of the Napoleonic 
codification in France (1808) (Donovan, 1999, pp.379-
383; Schnapper, 1987, pp.165-194), the jury was respected 
as one of the utmost democratic, liberal legal institutions, 
which held the most prestigious place among the values of 
procedural law of the European states for half a century. 
This also proves that the ideal of “Europeanism” resting 
upon common traditions – as the need for a substantial 
ideal uniting the nations – already existed at that time. 
However, the First World War overthrew the conception of 
the liberal state and pushed judgement by the jury into the 
background, too, although such signs could be observed 
from the turn of the century.
The Compromise of Austria and Hungary established 
an extraordinary connection between the two monarchies 
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in 1867, which is technically described as a real union 
of states. It meant that both Austria and Hungary were 
sovereign states but they had three common relations: 
foreign affairs, defence in the case of a war and the 
finances connected with the preceding areas (the term 
“Austro-Hungarian Monarchy” is rather a political than a 
legal expression). This cooperation functioned well but it 
came to a sudden end after World War I (Ruszoly, 2002; 
Máthé-Pölöskei-Zlinszky, 2000, pp.217-248, 305-342).
When, after several decades of preparation (Both, 
2009; Antal, 2009, pp.279-289; Balogh, 2010, pp.1-
46), the Hungarian Parliament debated the Code of 
Criminal Procedure in 1896, the desire for the extension 
of the powers of the jury seemed to be general in 
Hungary, too. Both jurists and the lay public hoped that 
it would promote the intact nature of judgement. Since 
the establishment of the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy 
(1867) there was some negative experience regarding 
the press offences sanctioned by Act XVIII of 1848, the 
Press Act (Varga, 2012, pp.60-61; Révész, 1986, pp.37-
54, 183-227) and later by Act V of 1878, the Criminal 
Code,1 or more precisely as to their judgement by a jury 
– the most frequent jury cases were in connection with 
the following crimes: defamation, vilification, outraging 
the Royal Family, offences against constitutionality or 
offences against the connections between Austria and 
Hungary by press –, but everyone hoped that the new 
statutory regulation would be sufficiently prudent to 
eliminate the earlier mistakes. For this reason, the Code of 
Criminal Procedure (Act XXXIII of 1896) created under 
the intellectual leadership of Dezső Szilágyi, Minister of 
Justice2 was passed by Parliament unanimously, partly 
regarding the extension of the scope of authority of the 
jury in the main trial (Bónis-Degré-Varga, 1996, pp.211-
231). However, the single act on the organization of jury 
panels (Act XXXIII of 1897) and the act on the enactment 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act XXXIV of 1897, 
further on: ‘Bpé’) received criticism from the opposition 
1 Károly Csemegi (1826-1899) was a recognised jurist during the 
Dualism; he worked for the Ministry of Justice as an Undersecretary 
of State and he led the codification of the first Hungarian Criminal 
Code (Act V of 1878), which is still called Csemegi-codex by the 
jurists. He formulated the first version of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure in 1872, which in fact was a reference book and not a 
statute, although judges used it as an authentic regulation until 1900. 
He did not support the introduction of the jury or the jurisdiction of 
any kind of lay courts. 
2 Dezső Szilágyi (1840-1901) was one of the most important 
Ministers of Justice in Hungary. Earlier he was a member of the 
House of Representatives and a Professor in Law at the University 
of Budapest. As a minister (1889-1895) he realized complex 
juridical reforms like the organization of the new appeal courts 
in 1890/91, the modernisation of the legal status of Hungarian 
judges (1891), the transformation of the institutions of the Austro-
Hungarian consular jurisdiction (1891) and the turning of church 
weddings into marriages registered by the clerks of the state (1894). 
Between 1895 and 1898 he was the president (Speaker) of the House 
of Representatives in the Hungarian Parliament. 
wherever possible (Antal, 2006, pp.222-243; Antal, 2009, 
pp.289-295). This was nobody’s expressed professional 
interest, but since the Code of Criminal Procedure came 
into force only as from January 1, 1900, this served as a 
good reason for the opposition to obstruct the government 
majority. 
The new jury tribunals – that is the joint criminal 
forums, which were set up of three professional judges 
and twelve, for the most part lay persons, and which 
were assembled usually once in a quarter year or in two, 
possibly in two and a half months – existed only in the 
seats of royal appeal courts before 1900 (Antal, 2012),3 
but later there were juries in sixty-four cities – almost in 
every county – until their suspension nearly countrywide 
in the autumn of 1914, which de facto meant their 
abolishment (Csizmadia, 1966; Vámbéry, 1900, pp.15-18; 
Stipta, 1998, pp.133-138).
These juries with an extended scope of authority 
judged in the main trials of actions filed in the following 
criminal offences: 1. in basic cases of high treason, 2. in 
the criminal act of assaulting the king, 3. in most kinds of 
infidelity, 4. against groups organized for the purpose of 
rebellion, 5. in the aggravated case of unlawful deprivation 
of personal freedom, 6. in particular cases of premeditated 
homicide (murder) and 7. voluntary manslaughter (e.g. 
American duel), 8. for the culpable abandonment of a 
child (exposure), 9. some types of bodily harm with fatal 
consequences and 10. criminal acts against public health, 
11.  in the cases of kidnapping a child and eloping with 
a girl under the age of fourteen, 12. in the case of the 
violation of personal freedom committed to the injury 
of a person in custody of the police, 13. in basic cases 
of robbery, 14. in the case of arson and if 15. causing a 
waterflood was to be punished severely, moreover 16. 
in the cases of damage to railroad equipment or damage 
caused on a steamboat, 17. in the cases of bribing judges 
and investigators, and finally 18. in the case of incitement 
in a gathering or by way of public display if such behavior 
was aimed at committing a criminal offence referred to 
the competence of the jury (Bpé, § 15).
The juries operating in the seats of the eleven royal 
appeal courts continued to have exclusive scope of 
authority in criminal offences committed through printed 
matters and press media, too, as well as in cases of minor 
offense committed through printed matters, moreover, in 
lawsuits of defamation and libel made in the press aimed 
at the members of the authority, or committed to the injury 
of a person acting in public service, concerning his or her 
official actions (Bpé, § 16). 
3 The places of the royal appeal courts were: Budapest (Hungary), 
Debrecen (Hungary), Győr (Hungary), Kassa (Košice, Slovakia), 
Kolozsvár (Cluj-Napoca, Romania), Marosvásárhely (Târgu Mureş, 
Romania), Nagyvárad (Oradea, Romania), Pécs (Hungary), Pozsony 
(Bratislava, Slovakia), Szeged (Hungary), Temesvár (Timişoara, 
Romania). 
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From among the great number of interesting legal 
cases – mostly related to murder or robbery –, I am going 
to briefly present a resounding criminal procedure held in 
Szeged City in the year of 1904. Its significance is also 
shown by the fact that it was partly due to this case that 
Ferenc Vargha, one of the most prominent Hungarian 
criminal lawyers of the era, published his great study 
against the jury right thereafter (Vargha, 1905).4
2. THE PÁL EREMITS MURDER
A traumatic event was reported in the papers on January 6 
and 7, 1904: parliamentary representative Pál Eremits was 
murdered in Nagykikinda City. Since Eremits had a large 
number of enemies there – according to general public 
opinion he was an unscrupulous usurer and mercenary – 
the Supreme Court appointed the unbiased jury of Szeged 
to make a judgement. June 21, 1904 was set by the 
chairman of the tribunal as the first date of the trial, before 
which journalists and jurists wishing to learn flocked to 
Szeged from all over the country in great numbers.
Following the opening of the trial the jury was set 
up. After practicing the mutual right to challenging 
by the royal prosecutor and the two accused men: 
Mladen (48) and George (28) Sibul, four merchants, a 
great entrepreneur, a chief accountant, two lawyers, a 
newspaper editor, a butcher, a jeweller and a baker were 
chosen as common jurors. Two craftsmen were selected 
as substitute jurors. Based on the occupations, the jury 
could be regarded as ordinary, or even more than average, 
considering that it included more intellectuals – including 
two jurists – than in general; it could not be labelled, 
using the contemporary expression, a “peasants’ jury” 
(Buchwald, 1900; Kármán, 1904).
The royal prosecutor stated the charge, which was 
premeditated murder committed with an accomplice and 
punishable by death according to the Criminal Code. 
The facts of the case were relatively simple: the accused 
admitted that on that fateful day in January they had 
murdered Pál Eremits – with extreme cruelty –, attacking 
him from ambush outside the district courthouse in broad 
daylight, in the presence of passers- by. They committed 
the crime with an iron rod and a revolver that they had 
purchased specifically for this purpose in the autumn of 
the previous year. They did not deny the motive, either: 
they had committed the murder because of their father, 
Próka Sibul being cheated out of his wealth, the ordeal 
caused by litigation for years and in the end losing it. The 
accused – obviously following their defence counsel’s 
4 Ferenc Vargha (1858–1940) was an outstanding legal professional 
both in practice and theory. His carrier included being a public 
prosecutor, a presiding judge at the high court of justice, and finally 
the Crown Prosecutor (highest public prosecutor). He also took part 
in the process of the codification of the 1896 Criminal Procedural 
Code mentioned. Concerning the present topic he did not appreciate 
lay men in jurisdiction.
advice – testified that they had wanted only to frighten, 
and not to murder, the ruiner of their family, who had 
acquired their properties by using a sham contract. What 
they sought to achieve with the alleged frightening was 
to persuade Eremits to give back some of their former 
lands after the unsuccessful criminal and then civil actions 
(1886, 1897). 
However, in the light of the contentions and all the 
circumstances of the case it was clear – and also found 
so later by the jury – that their intention had been not to 
frighten but to kill in a resolute and premeditated manner. 
It was also obvious for the audience skilled at law that 
in spite of drinking earlier, they had acted with complete 
capacity of discretion and in a planned way. The medical 
examiners also confirmed this in their testimonies. Neither 
of the accused was found to have a mental disorder which 
would exclude culpability. The weapons experts found 
that the revolver was working faultlessly and was an 
appropriate instrument for carrying out the act of murder. 
The hearing of more than fifteen witnesses did not bring 
any further developments.
In accordance with the law, the final pleadings were 
started by the prosecutor. In anticipation of antipathy on 
the jury’s part towards Eremits, he drew their attention to 
the fact that they were not above the law, consequently 
they had to abide not only by their own conscience, 
but also by the legal system. This message was not 
accidental: he referred to another nationally renowned 
case, the case of Mihály Nyuli, who the jury of Budapest 
acquitted in 1900 by making a very unusual verdict. In 
the statement of the prosecution on the merits he argued 
for premeditated murder and expounded that the intention 
to frighten could not be sustained by evidence, it was the 
case of express premeditated murder. He did not think 
that the passion of the accused was a realistic possibility 
because they clearly knew what they were doing and were 
able to weigh the consequences of their actions. Also, he 
had no doubts about the motive: they sought to avenge the 
injury that their family had suffered, which was intensified 
by the public feeling arising after the 1901 parliamentary 
elections in Nagykikinda in the wake of the suspicion of 
corruption.
The counsel for the defense began his speech with just 
the opposite reasoning: he admonished the jurors against 
acting as jurists and asked them only to keep the truth in 
view. The essence of his pleadings was constituted by 
the assertion of the exclusion of liability in criminal law: 
the accused parties’ will be influenced by despair and 
drinking pálinka (Hungarian brandy). He also doubted 
premeditation, saying that it was precluded by despair. He 
concluded that the accused had not been able to assess the 
life- endangering nature of their act – they had not been 
liable in criminal law. Finally, he referred to Eremits’s 
lawsuits for usury and 120% interest, 271 of which were 
kept in evidence and proved with documents. He closed 
his speech in defense of the accused: “What despair 
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could have risen in their hearts when they saw that the 
administration of justice on Earth could not find them the 
truth. Here, they administered justice to themselves and 
took revenge in their own way.” He gave the matter an 
appearance as if not Eremits, but the two brothers were 
the moral victims and asked for their acquittal.
The trial continued on the third day and the jury retired 
after the advisory instruction by the presiding justice. 
They were asked twenty-one questions altogether. They 
deliberated for two hours, then appeared in the courtroom 
again and revealed a surprising verdict to the judges and 
the audience: when they were asked the question whether 
the accused had committed the alleged act, they answered 
yes. However, as to the question of guilt, they answered 
no with reference to strong passion, and by doing so they 
accepted the position of the defense, namely that the 
perpetrators had not been liable in criminal law at the time 
of committing the murder. Thereafter, the judges – not 
having a right to do differently – passed their judgment, 
in which they acquitted the Sibul brothers of the charges 
and released them immediately. After the rendition of 
the verdict, the audience cheered enthusiastically and the 
jurors themselves congratulated the accused (!).
The representative of the prosecution lodged an appeal 
in cassation and argued that the court had applied the rule 
of law regarding liability in criminal law erroneously, in 
which Eremits’s heirs joined. However, since the decision 
was absolution – meaning that the jurors “erred” to the 
benefit of the accused and not to their detriment – there 
was only slight legal chance for cassation; in spite of this, 
“the opinion dominated even among judges and jurists 
that the Supreme Court was going to overrule the verdict 
of acquittal and grant the appeal in cassation under some 
pretext”. The Supreme Court discussed the case publicly 
at the end of 1904 and dismissed the aggrieved parties’ 
appeal in cassation, claiming that they had no right to 
it pursuant to the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the 
prosecutor’s motion for legal remedy was withdrawn 
unexpectedly by the Royal Prosecutor’s office a few 
days later, and thereby all legal grounds for a cassation 
procedure ceased to exist and the decision of the Szeged 
jury tribunal became final (res iudicata). Thus the case 
ended de jure in January, 1905 (Antal, 2006, pp.265-270).
CONCLUSION
In the days following the proclamation of the jury court’s 
decision, journalists covered the case nationwide; some 
with appreciation, some with stoic disappointment. 
Generally, the political newspapers stated their position 
in accordance with their party affiliation: the events were 
commented on negatively by the pro- government ones 
and positively by the opposition. However, the legal 
profession and the intellectual weeklies were shaken 
by the fiasco of the Szeged jury (Antal, 2006, pp.275-
277): They had to face what the English legal literature 
called the jury’s merciful discretion – the right that in the 
case of a verdict of acquittal, there is no possibility for 
legal remedy against the decision because of the wilful 
violation of the rules of substantive law. This anomaly 
arose in the late 18th century in England especially in 
the cases in which the accused, having been found guilty, 
might as well have been sentenced to death by the court, 
therefore the sympathetic jury (“pious perjury”) acquitted 
them instead (Handler, 2002; Hostettler, 2004, pp.97-99, 
109-115; Radzinowicz, 1948, pp.527-607).
There occurred similar cases of acquittal in Szeged 
later as well, which did no good for the national judgement 
of trial by jury. From among these, it was perhaps the 
infamous Haverda case (1910) which harmed this legal 
institution the most, even if eventually the Budapest jury, 
after rehearing the case, was able to remedy the damage to 
the reliability of the Hungarian administration of justice in 
that particular case (Jánossy, 1910).
The opinion on the Hungarian trial by jury is still 
controversial today. Undoubtedly, it had no time to run 
its course, as the criminal jury with an extended scope of 
authority functioned in Hungary only for fifteen years, 
whereas the earlier press juries worked only in a narrow 
field of law. The political- economic environment did 
not really favour the jury either, considering the tensions 
between the nationalities in the Hungarian society 
(Ruszoly, 2009).5 Theoretical jurists were rather in favour 
of the jury, while the majority of practicing jurists – 
particularly judges and public prosecutors – could not be 
convinced of the “advantages” of lay judgement (Antal, 
2009, pp.295-297) although – naturally – a large number 
of judgements corresponded to criminal law.
The attack of the legal profession on the jury 
culminated in the previously mentioned series of articles 
published in 1905 by Ferenc Vargha (1858-1940), later 
Crown Prosecutor. He expected a good judge to have 
three “golden” properties: legal knowledge, adequate 
psychological and logical abilities and, finally, to pass 
a vocational judgment which was suitable for review 
by the court of appeal. As far as the lay persons’ legal 
knowledge is concerned, it was distrusted already by the 
French, this was the reason why only the judgement of the 
question of facts was left to the jury in 1791. In contrast, 
the Hungarian code of procedure, which was based on the 
Austrian and German models, referred both the questions 
of facts and of law to the jury’s competence. Vargha 
5 Hungary was a multi-national country in the 19th century which 
caused several tensions in politics from 1848. Some say that these 
difficulties were responsible also for the death of the dual monarchy 
in 1918. The following minorities lived in Hungary at that time: 
Bulgarians, Poles, Romanians, Ukrainians, Serbians, Croatians, 
Slovenians, Slovakians, Saxons and other German speaking 
nationalities, also Armenians and Russians. Although the Hungarian 
Parliament carried acts on the rights of nationalities in 1849 and 
1868, the legal problems of minorities were not solved in Hungary 
or in Centre Europe. 
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demanded professionalism in judgement, too, in contrast 
with those who considered this “perilous”. When he was 
asked the question whether trial by jury had improved the 
administration of justice, his answer was a definite “no”. 
In his view, expertise at law and professionalism are the 
sine qua non of a judge’s character, whereas jurors did not 
have real responsibility for their decision because there 
was no official reason for the verdict.
He demonstrated the superiority of professional courts 
by analyzing the psychology of passing a judgement. 
During the procedure of evidence, key elements in making 
a decision are attention, recollection and the logical 
processing of the recollected material, the external form of 
appearance of which is: the decision of the court. A trained 
judge passes the judgement by collating and weighing 
the evidence, and this process of his can be checked in 
the reasoning, which the judge words a posterior. Jurors, 
however, are characterized by greater “suggestibility”, 
and each new impression imparts a different color to their 
sentiments, thereby continuously changing their frame 
of mind. He did not consider the verdict of a juror with 
a balanced, “more energetic” disposition more valuable 
than the verdict of a “capricious, changeable lay judge” 
either, because in the end he also decided on the basis of 
sentiments. This was also professed by the doctrine of the 
irradiation of intellectual sentiments, which propagated the 
preponderance of the dominant impression in the process 
of perception – instead of the words of law. As opposed 
to this, Vargha looked upon the “stereotyped” thinking of 
professional judges as the safest guarantee for finding the 
truth. He warned: even though the jury was democratic in 
composition, it was aristocratic in sentiments; the counsel 
for the defense could have a great effect on lay persons 
with a persuasive speech, which was coupled with the 
influence arising from personal contacts and the press. 
Ferenc Vargha reached the conclusion that lay persons 
should not be entrusted with the task to decide about 
questions of law, but at the same time he did not really 
consider them suitable to resolve questions of fact, either 
(Vargha, 1905; Finkey, 2000, pp.188-189).
Jenő Heimann (1881-1940) also held the view that 
Hungary was not mature enough for extending the trial 
by jury. Analysing the verdict of acquittal in Szeged, he 
pointed out that “the juror is not a judge, but a man who, 
as such, looks upon the accused as a suffering fellow- 
man and is involuntarily inclined to acquit him/her”. 
He agreed that the jurors were guided in making their 
decision by subjective moments, which excluded a fair, 
impartial verdict. He sighed painfully, “if Dezső Szilágyi 
could have lived to see a few years of statistics and could 
have seen how the most evil criminals were acquitted by 
the jury indiscriminately, he would have cried out – I say –: 
This is not what I wanted, not this” (Heimann, 1904). 
Hardly anyone opposed trial by jury with more wit 
than Izidor Baumgarten (1850-1914). Starting from Jean 
Jacques Rousseau’s doctrines, he identified the reasons 
for the introduction of the jury as giving preference to 
total ignorance and inexperience over the “schematic 
thinking” associated with every profession. In the age of 
Enlightenment, the false premise was that nature endowed 
the jurors with an “instinct for truth”. In the philosophical 
language of that age, the juror was the suffering, feeling 
and speaking instrument of criminal law, and his verdict 
was “the speech arising voluntarily from nature”.6 In fact, 
however, the members of the jury “want to play human 
instruments although they do not have the slightest idea 
of the rules of the functioning of human spirit, and they 
believe that a short description of the technique of art is 
worth as much as the masterful skill acquired through 
years of hard work learning how to play the instrument. 
[...] Art – Baumgarten continued – is nothing else but 
nature in the sentiment of a temperament, [...] [whereas] 
judgment is an event on the scales of intellect.” For 
this, reason must overcome sentiments. However, he 
held the legislator responsible for the mistakes, since 
the Hungarian procedure was of such nature that the 
juror could not always keep his oath – or the law – in it 
(Baumgarten, 1905, pp.14-18; Finkey, 2000, pp.182-183).
The problems mentioned weighed heavily on the 
judicial system until the First World War. A strange turn 
of history is that eventually the amendment of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure in the year of 1914 would have allowed 
cassation (the annulment of the verdict) by the Hungarian 
Supreme Court regarding verdicts of acquittal by the jury, 
too, if the jury erred in the “merits of the case” (Act XIII 
of 1914). Following the French model, the deliberation 
of the jury would have been chaired by the presiding 
judge personally, who earlier could not even enter the lay 
men’s room where the jurors retired. The methodology 
of constructing questions to be asked was also refined. 
We cannot say whether or not this would have brought 
a satisfactory solution, because – as already mentioned 
– this form of judgment ceased almost everywhere the 
same year following the declaration of the state of war 
in Hungary. Although the question of reactivation arose 
in the autumn of 1918 and 1919, the government further 
postponed giving a concrete answer – permanently.
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